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In a perfect world, labor markets would not be regulated. Compe-
tition, rather than union contracts or legislation, would determine
wages at a level consistent with full employment. Only technological
obstacles would prevent labor reallocation toward the most produc-
tive jobs and occupations. No subsidies would be paid to unemployed
workers, and employment would not be taxed.
The world we live in is not perfect, however, and the market for
labor services is more heavily regulated than most other markets.
The intensity and character of institutional interference with laissez-
faire determination of employment and wages exhibit some variation
over time, but they vary sharply across countries. Relating labor
market outcomes to institutional indicators—from payroll taxes fi-
nancing unemployment and social security benefits, to the minimum
wage, collective bargaining provisions, and job security legislation—
has made it possible to assess empirically their implications for ag-
gregate and disaggregated employment and unemployment rates, for
wage inequality, and for macroeconomic trends and cycles. The lit-
erature mostly treats labor market institutions as exogenous deter-
minants of labor market outcomes. Less attention has been directed
at explaining and interpreting the motivation behind institutional
arrangements in the labor market. Efforts in the latter direction are
all the more necessary when researchers study labor market institu-
tions in a heterogeneous group of countries, as in the case of the
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contributions collected in Heckman and Pagés (2004). The chapters
of that book, as well as the editors’ introduction, provide interesting
analyses of individual Latin American countries and comparisons of
samples of Latin American countries and member countries of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
The studies make it clear that comparisons across diverse countries
are useful, but difficult, and they are not easily conducive to sharp
insights. When the structure of the problems facing the countries
(and markets and individuals within countries) is very heterogeneous
in the sample considered, it is necessary in principle and hard in
practice to disentangle the implications of structural characteristics
from those of institutions and policies.
To understand why policy aims at distorting labor market outcomes,
it is important to consider the effects of institutions on distribution and
allocation in a second-best environment. Policies that would be clearly
inefficient in a hypothetical representative-agent/perfect-markets situ-
ation can appeal to workers’ representatives because they make it pos-
sible for their constituents to earn a larger share of aggregate welfare.
The pros and cons of labor market institutions thus depend on deep
structural and political features of different economies. The implemen-
tation of legislation and other collective action reflects not only the
relative efficiency of market and policy mechanisms from a hypotheti-
cal representative agent’s perspective, but also whether and how fi-
nancial and other market imperfections prevent workers from
internalizing profitability losses (see Bertola, 2004). The effectiveness
of labor market regulation in shifting welfare toward workers depends
on the extent to which employers may flexibly adjust on other mar-
gins, which in turn reflects an economy’s degree of openness to inter-
national trade and factor flows, among other factors (see Bertola and
Boeri, 2002). Moreover, the extent to which labor interests influence
institutional arrangements reflects political factors, which in turn de-
pends on a country’s social and political structure.1
This paper offers a simple formalization of some relevant interac-
tion channels and discusses their applicability to OECD and Latin
American countries. Section 1 outlines a simple framework for labor
market analysis, which offers a stylized representation of realistic
sources of production and welfare inefficiencies. Section 2 discusses
how institutional interference with laissez-faire in labor markets bears
1. See Saint-Paul (2000) for a wide-ranging analysis of the political economic
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on labor allocation. The formal framework used to illustrate the rel-
evant insights is a simple explicit version of models analyzed by Bertola
(2004b); an appendix reports mathematical derivations.
Section 3 discusses how detailed evidence from OECD countries
can be interpreted from the resulting theoretical perspective. Sec-
tion 4 offers an illustrative empirical exercise on simple available
indicators of aggregate labor market institutions and outcomes in
both OECD and Latin American countries. The exercise shows that
basic insights from the similarly limited OECD evidence that was
available in the early 1990s are applicable to Latin American coun-
tries. Section 5 concludes with an outline of new challenges and op-
portunities in empirical analysis of countries that regulate their labor
markets heavily, but that differ in important respects from OECD
members and lack comparable statistics regarding disaggregated la-
bor market outcomes.
1. A SIMPLE PERSPECTIVE ON LABOR MARKETS
The following discussion is centered on a basic tool of labor eco-
nomics, namely, the negative relation between employment and wage
levels implied by a standard labor demand function. The appendix
specifies a constant-elasticity functional form for that relation, with
multiplicative shifts in the level of productivity and wages associated
with each employment level. Specifically, the market features both
good jobs, which are characterized by relatively high productivity,
and bad ones, with relatively low productivity. Workers may also not
be employed. For simplicity, non-employed workers’ income-equiva-
lent flow of utility is a given constant in the model discussed in the
appendix and illustrated by the figures below. The qualitatively simi-
lar implications of upward-sloping labor supply are briefly discussed
below.
1.1 Perfect Markets
The labor market model has only two endogenous variables: the
overall level of employment and the fraction of that employment allo-
cated to high-productivity jobs. Consider first how these are determined
when efficient marginal conditions maximize total production in a static
setting. As shown in figure 1 and derived formally in the appendix,
the wage earned by employed workers depends on the fraction of20 Giuseppe Bertola
high-productivity employment, which in equilibrium is such as to equal-
ize wages across all employment opportunities if mobility among them
is costless. The overall level of employment must be such as to equal-
ize that single wage to the income-equivalent utility flow of individu-
als who are not employed. These individuals are out of the labor force
in the perfect-market situation discussed here, but they may be in-
voluntarily unemployed in some of the institutional configurations
discussed below.
This employment allocation maximizes production, inclusive of
equivalent non-employment income. It thus also maximizes the in-
come of the “representative” individual who owns labor and other
factors of production in the same proportions as the aggregate
economy. It does not, however, maximize the income of workers. In
the baseline case, in which the non-employment opportunities of work-
ers are represented by a given constant, if the marginal worker is
indifferent to employment, then all workers are, and their welfare is
left unchanged by the fact that some of them are employed.
1.2 Underemployment
Since the average product of labor is larger than its marginal prod-
uct, suppliers of labor benefit from restricting supply, like any monopo-
list. Workers as a group enjoy higher total income and utility if the
level of employment is lower than that which equalizes wages and non-
employment opportunities, because the labor demand relation implies
that all wages will then be higher than non-employment income.
Figure 1. Labor Allocation across High- and Low-productivity
Jobsa
a. The crossing point is identified by equation (2) in the appendix. The parameters are as follows: Ag = 2;
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Of course, that lower level of employment can still be allocated effi-
ciently across jobs. In that case, as shown in figure 2, worker welfare
increases with non-employment as the latter becomes larger than in
laissez-faire, and it continues to increase until further decreases in
employment outweigh the positive wage-bill effect of higher wage rates.
1.3 Worker Reallocation Costs
Consider next the implications of labor demand shocks. Labor
productivity at each job may, with some probability, switch from good
to bad or from bad to good. If mobility is costless, it should ensure
that employment levels are so much higher at the good sites that the
downward-sloping productivity (and wage) of labor is equalized across
all jobs. If mobility is costly, however, the marginal productivity at
good jobs must be higher than that at bad ones, because only a posi-
tive spread between the two can offset mobility costs. If the costs of
mobility are paid by risk-averse workers rather than by a well-diver-
sified representative agent, then the wage instability generated by
costly arbitrage across employment opportunities has important im-
plications for worker behavior and worker welfare.
The appendix formally analyzes a situation in which the labor
income of a worker who is relocating from a bad to a good job falls
short of the good wage by a fixed proportion that represents, for ex-
ample, time spent seeking and reaching the new employment oppor-
tunity. Mobility costs are specified as a fraction of the wages for
Figure 2. Worker Welfare as a Function of Non-employed
Labora
a. Equation (4) in the appendix. The vertical line identifies the competitive allocation (Wg = Wb = Wu). The
parameters are as follows: Ag = 2; Ab = 1; β  = 0.33; Wu = 1; and α  = 0.1.22 Giuseppe Bertola
high-productivity jobs. Since those wages decrease (along downward-
sloping labor demand functions) when the labor market delivers more
labor to such jobs, more intense mobility reduces the cost of mobil-
ity.2 The simple model also supposes that workers’ utility is a strictly
concave function of their labor income, net of mobility costs. As in
Bertola (2004b), this represents the limited opportunities for workers
to access financial markets in order to smooth their consumption in
the face of labor income shocks.
Since mobility toward good jobs is financed out of relatively low
consumption flows, its costs in terms of utility are higher than they
would be if labor income risk could be insured and pooled at the ag-
gregate level. To spur mobility, future expected wage gains need to
be larger when their decreasing marginal utility is smaller relative
to that of the moving workers’ low consumption. The labor market
delivers larger wage differentials by allocating less labor to currently
more productive jobs or, equivalently, by reducing the intensity of
labor mobility from low- to high-productivity jobs. As fewer units of
labor move from low- to high-productivity jobs, the latter become less
numerous in steady state, and aggregate production is low in an
economy where risk-averse workers finance mobility.
The net production flow of the model in the appendix is plotted in
figure 3 as a function of the share of employment in high-productivity
jobs, for given total employment. The labor allocation delivered by
this simple labor market’s decentralized equilibrium is identified by
the vertical dashed line. It falls short of maximizing production for
two reasons. On the one hand, the intensity of labor reallocation is
lower than would be necessary to maximize production flows, because
the specification of mobility costs makes them a decreasing function
of mobility through external effects. On the other, workers’ utility cur-
vature unambiguously implies that the fraction of good employment is
reduced by the need to offer larger wage differentials to moving work-
ers. When mobility costs bear on individual workers’ consumption,
rather than on aggregate resources, decentralized decisions intuitively
fail to maximize the latter. As in the case of the total employment level,
if workers’ consumption coincides with their labor income, then the
2. This may represent market-thickness effects of the type studied by Hosios
(1990) and others in markets that clear through search rather than price-taking
behavior. In such models, these external effects may imply that mobility is exces-
sive in decentralized equilibrium. The simple framework outlined in the appendix
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impact of labor allocation on their welfare differs from the impact of
that same variable on total production (and on the welfare of individu-
als who earn non-labor income). The average utility yielded to work-
ers by each unit of employment allocated on the basis of uninsured
mobility decisions is plotted in figure 4. It is a monotonically increas-
ing function of the fraction of high-productivity employment, for the
simple reason that average wage both increase and become more equal
as more workers are employed at firms with a strong labor demand.
Figure 3. Aggregate Production as a Function of
High-productivity Employmenta
a. Equation (10) in the appendix. Aggregate production is net of mobility costs. The parameters are as follows:
Ag = 2; Ab = 1; β  = 0.33; Wu = 1; α  = 0.1; p = 0.2; and X = 0.3. The vertical line identifies the allocation implied by
condition 9 in the appendix.
Figure 4. Average Welfare of Employed Workers as
a Function of High-productivity Employmenta
a. Equation (12) in the appendix. The parameters are as follows: Ag = 2; Ab = 1; β  = 0.33; Wu = 1; α  = 0.1; p = 0.2; and
X = 0.3. The vertical line identifies the laissez-faire allocation implied by condition 9 in the appendix.24 Giuseppe Bertola
In summary, the simple model highlights related, but conceptually
different interactions among the welfare of workers, the economy’s
productivity, and the allocation of labor across high-wage, low-wage,
and non-employed states. First, as workers disregard the portion of
the economy’s total production that does not accrue to them in the
form of wages, their welfare is not maximized by the laissez-faire em-
ployment level determined by decentralized decisions. Reducing em-
ployment has a negligible negative effect at the point at which the
wage is equal to non-employment opportunities, but the higher wage
enjoyed by all the workers who remain employed has a first-order ben-
eficial effect on collective workers’ welfare. This is obviously true when
all employed workers are strictly indifferent between employment and
non-employment in laissez-faire, and it is also true when an upward-
sloping labor supply schedule lets employed workers enjoy some sur-
plus. Second, reallocation of labor from low-productivity to
high-productivity jobs improves the economy’s total productivity. How-
ever, when it is driven by the mobility decisions of risk-averse workers
whose consumption directly bears the cost of mobility, it is not as ben-
eficial to their welfare and, in decentralized equilibrium, falls short of
the intensity that would maximize total production net of mobility costs.
2. LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION
The stylized model above highlights qualitative mechanisms that
arguably motivate most collective interventions aimed at altering
laissez-faire wage and employment outcomes. This section discusses
that possibility and explores whether and how collectively decided
policy measures and structural mechanisms interact to determine
labor market outcomes.
2.1 Overall Employment
Workers’ preferred employment level differs from that of a hypo-
thetical representative individual interested in maximizing the
economy’s total production flow over and above the workers’ non-
employment opportunities. If workers only earn labor income, they
do not mind reducing the portion of output that accrues to other fac-
tors of production. Hence, they prefer wages to be higher than those
delivered by competitive interactions, and they may gladly accept the
reduction in employment that delivers that outcome. If the wage isDistribution, Efficiency, and Labor Market Regulation 25
increased above that which equates aggregate supply and demand,
workers who have no stake in profits or rents are collectively better
off. Lower employment is a matter of indifference at the margin in
laissez-faire. As wages become discretely higher than non-employment
welfare, the simple sum of workers’ utilities continues to increase
until the lower welfare of workers who fall back on the outside oppor-
tunity more than compensates the higher wage earned by the work-
ers who remain employed.3
This perspective can rationalize legal, or otherwise collectively set,
minimum wages. If individual workers were allowed to bid for employ-
ment, any situation in which some workers remain unemployed who
would rather be working would unravel to the competitive outcome. A
legal prohibition to do so, as implied by mandated minimum wages or
by the administrative extension of collective wage agreements to all
workers, supports an outcome that is in the workers’ collective inter-
est because it eliminates each individual worker’s incentive to bid for
another’s job. Of course, the unemployed would ex post prefer to be
employed, especially if (as in the situation illustrated above) individual
utility functions are strictly concave. However, a low-employment out-
come can be agreeable to all workers if non-employed workers can
partake of the higher average productivity and wages of employed work-
ers. Some such redistribution occurs through intrafamily transfers, as
in the case when the unemployed are sons and daughters of the em-
ployed. Outcomes with a larger wage bill and lower employment (and
profits) may also be supported by a system of payroll taxation that
funds either non-employment subsidies—such as pensions, unemploy-
ment benefits, and other welfare transfers—or public-sector employ-
ment opportunities at favorable wage-effort ratios (Algan, Cahuc, and
Zylberberg, 2002). The purpose and effect of all such policies are simi-
lar to those of an explicit wage floor: while the latter prohibits workers
from bidding down other workers’ wages, income support eliminates
the need to bid for employment.
A variety of collective policies can thus insert a wedge between
labor demand labor supply, thereby reducing employment. Contractual
or legislative lower bounds on wages result in open unemployment, as
do tax-and-subsidy schemes in a smaller or less effectively employed
3. This point is reached sooner when labor supply is steeper. As discussed by
Bertola, Blau, and Kahn (2002b), this can explain why labor market regulation
tends to cause smaller employment losses for worker groups with rigid labor
supply (such as prime-age males).26 Giuseppe Bertola
labor force. In different countries and periods, a range of policies are
implemented in divergent ways and more or less incisively (see the
discussion in the next section), and they can be interpreted in terms
of distributional conflicts taking place under structural constraints,
represented by the downward slope of the labor demand function.
Not only the ease of union organization and the ability to enforce
collectively agreed wages on all workers, but also the ability to use
non-market instruments to redistribute the wage bill from high-wage
employed workers to unemployed workers affect the desirability and
feasibility of the low-employment outcome that approximates the
maximization problem illustrated in figure 2.
2.2 Labor Reallocation and Income Stability
Institutions also interfere with the dynamics of labor reallocation
in the face of labor demand shocks. Recall that the simple model
outlined above does not allow workers to shelter their consumption
from labor demand fluctuations by accessing financial markets. Then,
smaller wage differentials and easier mobility not only improve work-
ers’ welfare through a standard consumption-smoothing channel, but
also better aligns individual mobility incentives to aggregate rates of
transformation, which tends to improve productive efficiency as in-
dexed by the proportion of high-productivity employment in the model.
Addressing this imperfection would thus be in the interest of both
employers and workers.
In reality, workers’ consumption and their mobility investments
can be financed by contingent financial securities, by self-insurance
through asset accumulation and decumulation, and by private labor
contracts with employer-financed training or severance pay provi-
sions. All such instruments fall short, however, of implementing the
smooth consumption paths and efficiency-based reallocation and re-
training decisions that would characterize a labor market with per-
fect financial market access. Empirically, earnings and consumption
data tend to track each other quite closely at the individual level,
especially at the low end of their distributions.4
When private financial and labor market contracts cannot shel-
ter workers’ consumption from idiosyncratic labor demand shocks
and ensure that labor reallocation takes place efficiently, collective
4. See Attanasio and Davis (1996); Cutler and Katz (1992); Blundell and Preston
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interventions can try to achieve both goals. In the stylized framework
outlined above, improvement on the laissez-faire outcome entails tax-
ing the payroll of high-productivity jobs, subsidizing that of low-pro-
ductivity jobs, and reducing the workers’ cost of moving from the
latter to the former. Intuitively, taxing high wage realizations that
have relatively low marginal utility and subsidizing the consumption
of workers who earn low wages makes sense from an ex ante insur-
ance point of view. Moreover, since equalization of take-home pay
would remove workers’ incentives to move toward high-productivity
jobs, a policy package meant to mimic a first-best allocation also needs
to finance mobility out of aggregate resources, subsidizing mobility
as needed to ensure that additional production is valued on the risk-
neutral basis appropriate for idiosyncratic shocks.
Many real-life policies can be interpreted from this perspective.
Progressive taxation can smooth workers’ income and consumption,
thereby offsetting the implications of missing insurance markets
(Varian, 1980). Centralized contracts which specify a compressed wage
structure across heterogeneous regions or sectors can be rational-
ized by risk aversion on the part of immobile workers (Agell and
Lommerud, 1992). Unemployment insurance schemes, in turn, can
fund job losers’ search for high-productivity jobs and ease their exit
from low-productivity, low-consumption jobs while also making them
more reluctant to take similar ones. Active labor market policies of-
fer training and job-search assistance to displaced workers, as well as
job subsidies to low-earners; they can, in principle, address the effi-
ciency implications of uninsured workers’ reluctance to undertake
forward-looking investment decisions. Employment protection legis-
lation also tends to have qualitatively similar effects in an equilib-
rium environment. By making it costly to dismiss workers, such
legislation induces labor hoarding at low-productivity firms, and the
wedge between wages and labor’s marginal productivity at such firms
is similar to that introduced by an explicit low-wage subsidy. Concern
with future firing difficulties discourages hiring at the model’s high-
productivity firms, so employment protection tends to depress wages
below marginal productivity there, just like a payroll tax would. Em-
ployment protection measures can also ease reallocation, as mobility
subsidies would, to the extent that they mandate payments to work-
ers who are laid off through no fault of their own, induce such pay-
ments in equilibrium, or encourage employers to react to labor demand
shocks by reorganizing their workforce internally rather than through
market mechanisms.28 Giuseppe Bertola
Using such policies to address the shortcomings of laissez-faire
allocations is desirable in principle. In practice, the collective admin-
istration of tax subsidies and severance schemes is imperfect and
certainly not costless, such that these mechanisms may be more or
less advisable in different circumstances.
Unemployment Insurance…
The details of policy implementation are important in models that
explicitly account for the informational asymmetries that prevent
markets from supporting insurance contracts and prevent collective
policies from achieving perfect efficiency. Much depends on equilib-
rium interactions and what causes unemployment in the first place.
When unemployed workers are tempted to exert low search effort, a
declining pattern of benefits can induce them to intensify their search
initially. This efficiently reduces the duration of unemployment, even
though the relatively high initial level of benefits affords the same
overall insurance as that implied by a lower constant level (Shavell
and Weiss, 1979). However, the different search behavior of unem-
ployed workers influences the equilibrium distribution of wage of-
fers: declining benefits can lead to the inefficient rejection of low wage
offers by unemployed workers receiving high initial benefits, even as
their stronger search effort increases their rate of matching (Albrecht
and Vroman, 2003); and high initial benefits can reduce the efforts of
currently employed workers to retain their jobs (Wang and
Williamson, 1996). The benefits and costs of unemployment insur-
ance systems depend on the character of information problems and
market interactions, while the balance between them depends on the
efficiency of policy implementation.
…and Employment Protection
Employment protection legislation requires that the termination
of individual employees be motivated and that workers be given rea-
sonable notice or financial compensation in lieu of notice. It grants
workers a right to appeal against termination, sometimes stipulating
reinstatement with back pay when the appeal is successful. Since
such rights may not be lawfully overridden by contractual provisions,
employment protection legislation interferes with individual contrac-
tual freedom as regards dynamic aspects of employment protection,
just like administrative extension of collective agreements similarly
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legislation often mandates administrative procedures, involving for-
mal negotiations with workers’ organizations and local or national au-
thorities, when large employers wish to proceed to collective dismissals
or plant closures. These and other aspects of labor law aim at address-
ing informational problems and ascertaining whether dismissals are
fair: in countries with stringent employment protection legislation,
the letter of the law may allow employers to fire incompetent or lazy
workers, but firms are required to prove—through regrettably costly
court procedures—that termination is justified. The administrative
review of collective dismissals is generally aimed at ascertaining that
employers have properly considered ways to adjust internally and en-
couraging them to compensate workers for the social costs of dismiss-
als—costs that financial markets may fail to internalize properly to
firms’ dynamic profit maximization problems. While it would be quite
naive to expect government interventions to provide free of cost the
same insurance that markets find it impossible to provide, it would
also be naive to presume that properly designed policies cannot go
some way toward resolving the relevant imperfections (Bertola, 2004).
2.3 Insurance and Production Efficiency
Institutional intervention in the labor market certainly entails costly
information collection and performance monitoring, together with pos-
sible deadweight inefficiencies, but at the same time it may improve
the efficiency of market allocations in an imperfect world. Not only
markets, but also collective policies can present difficulties for imple-
menting appropriate state-contingent transfers both to improve work-
ers’ welfare and increase aggregate production (and profits). The relative
merits of different policies vis-à-vis markets depend on structural fea-
tures. A society that can process information more efficiently at the
aggregate level than in market interactions is likely to feature active
policy interventions based on tax-and-subsidy packages or the direct
management of labor reallocation costs. Societies with limited admin-
istrative capabilities might tend to privilege simple regulatory policies
and, as in the case of employment protection legislation, mandate
employers (who are presumably better informed and better insured
than their employees) with avoiding or financing labor reallocation.5
5. Experience-rated contributions to reallocation or unemployment funds, of
the type advocated by Blanchard and Tirole (2003), may combine elements of
both. In reality, workers’ marginal utility and employers’ marginal productivity
are not directly observable, and they are much more heterogeneous than in the
simple two-state model used here for illustration purposes. Hence, labor courts
and designers of bureaucratic schemes face difficult problems.30 Giuseppe Bertola
In general, one would expect to see relatively limited policy inter-
ference in economies where it causes small beneficial effects and large
deadweight losses because, for example, a very elastic structure of
economic interactions gives ample scope for individuals to escape regu-
lation and taxation. However, the welfare effects of policy are not the
same for workers who cannot shelter their consumption from income
fluctuations and for individuals who can access perfect financial mar-
kets. As shown in figure 4, workers benefit from an increased alloca-
tion of labor to high-productivity jobs, but mobility per se does not
improve workers’ welfare, which is only a function of the overall level
and stability of wages. While an efficient allocation of labor increases
profits, it does not benefit uninsured workers when it is achieved by
making wages more flexible (and consumption more volatile). Hence,
workers and other agents differ in how they are affected by any given
policy’s impact on productive efficiency.
To illustrate this point, I present a policy that, in the context of
the uninsured labor reallocation model of section 1, imposes a pro-
portional payroll tax on all employment relationships at good firms,
pays a proportional subsidy to all workers employed by bad firms, and
uses a portion of excess good-wage tax revenues (which exceed low-
wage subsidies, since bad jobs are less numerous and pay lower wages
than good jobs) to pay a subsidy to all workers who are changing jobs.
This policy configuration leaves employers free of turnover costs, but
the implications for marginal productivities can be similar to those of
employment protection legislation, as mentioned.
By correcting the misallocation introduced in laissez-faire by work-
ers’ inability to access financial markets, redistribution and mobility
subsidies can improve both workers’ welfare and the economy’s over-
all production flow, provided the policy implementation is efficient
(that is, more efficient than private financial market interactions).
Figure 5 plots worker welfare and overall production as a function of
the tax-and-subsidy rate, when 20 percent of net tax revenues is lost
to administrative and deadweight costs. Although policy implementa-
tion is costly, efficiency gains can be obtained in the second-best situ-
ation we are considering. The welfare of workers whose consumption
is smoothed by the tax-and-subsidy component of the policy increases
relative to its laissez-faire level, normalized at unity in the figure.
The policy also has a positive effect on the economy’s overall produc-
tion flow, since it subsidizes mobility and increases the fraction of
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Figure 5 shows that the welfare of workers increases as the policy
becomes more incisive, because they benefit from higher, more stable
consumption. It continues to increase even as net production flattens
out, through the insurance-based channel. Figure 6 illustrates a very
inefficient policy that sets to zero the fraction of payroll tax revenue
devoted to mobility subsidies. Worker welfare is still an increasing
function of the tax-and-subsidy rate (which smoothes consumption),
but the net production flow declines dramatically as equalization of
take-home pay removes workers’ incentives to move toward more
productive jobs. Workers’ insurance gains lead them to prefer even
very wasteful arrangements of this type to a laissez-faire that bur-
dens them (and not society) with mobility costs and, as shown in fig-
ure 7, leads to a sharp decline of “profits” (or income flows accruing to
factors of production other than labor) as incentives to mobility are
removed. This can decrease total production if the supply of non-
labor factors of production is elastic (for example, if capital can flow
into and out of the economy considered).
In summary, just as workers who have no stake in aggregate pro-
duction over and above their wages do not appreciate high employment
that depresses wages toward their outside opportunity, so workers with-
out access to financial instruments favor policies that stabilize their
labor income. They support such policies even when they have negative
effects on aggregate production, because they reduce labor mobility along
Figure 5. Total Net Production Flow and Worker Welfare as
a Function of Labor Taxes and Subsidies, with Mobility
Subsidiesa
a. Large proportion of resulting revenues from taxes on high wages is used to subsidize low wages. Total net
production flow is from equation (10) and worker welfare from equation (12) in the appendix; λ  = 80 percent of
the remaining revenue finances mobility subsidies; other parameters are as in the previous figures.32 Giuseppe Bertola
with the wage and consumption differentials that drive it. Labor mar-
ket institutions may thus reduce overall employment when workers
have limited access to ownership of non-labor factors of production
and consumption-smoothing opportunities and when they have some
weight in political decisionmaking processes. Under the same cir-
cumstances, wage compression may reduce workers’ incentives to
reallocate or retrain at the same time that dismissal restrictions with
costly administrative authorization procedures prevent labor reallo-
cation, rather than finance and encourage it.
Figure 6. Total Net Production Flow and Worker Welfare as
a Function of Labor Taxes and Subsidies, without Mobility
Subsidiesa
a. Large proportion of resulting revenues from taxes on high wages is used to subsidize low wages. The parameters
are the same as in figure 5, except that λ  = 0 (that is, high-wage tax revenue that is not used to subsidize low wages
is wasted).
Figure 7. Gross Production Flow Minus Gross Wage Flowa
a. The parameters are the same as in figure 5.Distribution, Efficiency, and Labor Market Regulation 33
2.4 Why Are Institutions So Different across
Countries?
The question of why institutions differ across countries is diffi-
cult to answer precisely, but it is easy to answer in broad generality.
As illustrated by the theoretical framework discussed above, the ben-
efits and costs of collective interventions in the labor market depend
on structural features (such as the externality arising from the speci-
fication of mobility costs above), the ease of individual financial mar-
ket access (as indexed by the degree of utility curvature in the simple
model above), and the efficiency of collectively implemented policies.
The costs and benefits of the relevant policies and institutions also
differ across individuals. Incomplete financial markets imply that ag-
gregate efficiency considerations are not conveyed to all individuals by
appropriate prices, and the resulting incentives to introduce distor-
tions are heterogeneous across individuals with different productivity,
non-employment opportunities, or mobility costs. Minimum wages, for
example, certainly reduce the employment opportunities of low-pro-
ductivity individuals at the same time that they increase the average
wage and reduce the dispersion of wages among higher-productivity
workers. Such distributional effects within the population of workers
—rather than between workers and capitalists—interact importantly
with a variety of economic and social characteristics of the relevant
population. Heterogeneous labor productivity may depend on exogenous
characteristics, such as age and gender, but it may also reflect policies
and individual choices regarding education and training. The impact of
lower employment on consumption and welfare for low-wage workers
depends, first, on whether such workers belong to families who also
gain from the better wages of higher-productivity workers and, sec-
ond, on their non-employment opportunities.
The need to address market failures, the ability of collective schemes
to do so, and the political weight of those interested in obtaining more
protection against consumption shocks at the expense of productive
efficiency all differ across economies and historical periods. This can,
in principle, offer useful insight into the rationale of institutional set-
tings and the desirability of reforms. Distributional concerns within an
economy subject to uninsurable reallocation shocks can explain why
labor market institutions often aim at providing job and wage security
in the face of uninsurable labor demand shocks. Empirically, the rela-
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is no clear evidence that regulated labor markets lead to inefficiency
or that open economies tend to deregulate (Agell, 2002). The effects of
institutions depend on the same economic features that may lead to
their adoption. It is thus empirically difficult to disentangle endogenous
interactions among structural and institutional features from exog-
enous differences across countries. Labor market institutions, employ-
ment prospects, and access to financial markets all interact
endogenously, and it is not easy to ascertain the direction of causality
in these interactions since institutions’ economic effects also bear on
their desirability. For example, the proportion of long-term unemploy-
ment is high in countries with high job security and generous unem-
ployment benefits. Models with exogenous institutions explain small
flows in and out of unemployment as the endogenous result of optimiz-
ing choices by workers (who will not search as hard when benefits are
high) and employers (who will not hire and fire as much when firing
costs are high). It is also possible, however, to interpret the evidence
in terms of institutions’ desirability, since workers will be inclined to
favor stringent employment protection and generous employment ben-
efits when job loss entails long periods of unemployment with little
job-finding prospects. The development of financial markets may also
be partly endogenous to demand for financial services, which can be
choked by extensive regulation and redistribution.
Such positive feedback between the motivation behind policies
and their effects implies that small differences in truly exogenous
features of different economies can lead to widely divergent outcomes.
For example, cultural and ethnic homogeneity may ease the imple-
mentation of collective policies, while an efficient legal system may
improve market interactions. The structure of product markets also
matters, in that real wages are determined by producers’ markups
over labor costs and by union markups over non-employment welfare
(Nicoletti and others, 2001). While such features are not easy to mea-
sure and need not be fully exogenous to economic interactions,
progress has been made in bringing such a perspective to bear on
labor market institutions. Djankov and others (2003) and Bertola and
Koeniger (2004) offer different perspectives on the relation between
indicators of judicial efficiency, labor market institutions and out-
comes, and financial market features. The following sections outline
simple empirical facts that, while stopping short of answering the
question above, offer suggestive indications of meaningful covariation
across aspects of labor market regulation and labor market outcomes.Distribution, Efficiency, and Labor Market Regulation 35
3. SOME EVIDENCE FROM INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES
A vast literature studies unemployment and other aspects of la-
bor market experience in light of labor market institutions, empha-
sizing the contrast between the United States (and other Anglo-Saxon
countries), on the one hand, and European (especially Continental
European) countries, on the other. The experiences of these two groups
of OECD member countries have largely mirrored each other over
the last few decades: in the 1960s through much of the 1970s, the
unemployment rate of typical European countries was much smaller
than its U.S. counterpart, but by the late 1980s a virtually uninter-
rupted trend increase had raised European unemployment rates above
U.S. rates by a large multiple. The literature seeking explanations
for this reversal of fortunes focuses primarily on labor market insti-
tutions, such as high levels of union coverage and generous social
insurance benefits. Since cross-country differences in such respects
were largely the same in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the literature
also focuses on restrictive monetary policy in Europe and other mac-
roeconomic shocks that have been found to explain a large portion of
diverging unemployment experiences, especially when interacted with
institutional features. Public employment patterns and demographic
factors (such as the rapidly decreasing youth population) also play a
potentially important role.6
The relation between labor market institutions and the inequality
and instability of labor incomes is particularly relevant from this per-
spective. Empirical work on such aspects can exploit the wide varia-
tion in the stringency of employment protection legislation across OECD
countries. Only some employment protection features are readily mea-
sured quantitatively, such as the number of months’ notice required
for individual and collective dismissals. Others are more difficult to
measure precisely, as in the case of the labor courts’ willingness to
entertain appeals by fired workers or judges’ interpretation of the no-
tion of just cause for termination. When available employment protec-
tion indicators are positively correlated with each other, however, it is
possible to form qualitatively unambiguous cross-country rankings of
6. For a review of the issues and empirical results, see Bertola, Blau, and
Kahn (2002a) and the references therein, especially Nickell and Layard (1999);
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000); Nickell and others (2003); and Algan, Cahuc, and
Zylberberg (2002). See Bertola (2001) for a review of simple economic insights and
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employment protection legislation and then to relate these rankings to
qualitative indicators of labor market performance, in light of theoreti-
cal implications. The evidence reviewed by Bertola (1999) suggests that
more stringent employment protection legislation is indeed associated
with more stable aggregate employment paths. The remainder of this
section briefly reviews some simple evidence on the relation between
labor market institutions and labor income distribution and stability in
OECD countries. The relevant empirical findings are illustrated by
simple bivariate graphs. Since many aspects of labor market regula-
tion are highly collinear across countries, these graphs offer remark-
ably clear insights, which can be confirmed on a multivariate basis.7
Figure 8 plots wage inequality against the OECD employment
protection index. In line with the simple theoretical perspective out-
lined above, wages are compressed in the same markets where em-
ployment protection legislation is most stringent. Quantitative firing
restrictions, in fact, could hardly be binding if wage fluctuations were
completely unrestrained: wages would fall in response to the labor
7. See Bertola, Blau, and Kahn (2002b) and the references therein, and Bertola
(2004a), which focuses particularly on the changing impact and configuration of
labor market institutions in OECD countries.
Figure 8. Employment Protection and Wage Dispersiona
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from OECD.
a. The horizontal axis is the employment protection ranking based on 1990s indicators (the lower the value, the
more stringent the protection); the vertical axis is the ratio of median wages to the tenth percentile of the wage
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demand shocks that employment protection legislation is meant to
protect workers against, making stable employment profitable or in-
ducing voluntary quits. Hence, limiting the freedom offered to employ-
ers and workers in setting wages gives force to quantity constraints.
Moreover, to the extent that severance payments reduce workers’
mobility costs and are larger when they are mandated by legislation
than when they are left to imperfect private contracts, it is not surpris-
ing to find that more stringent employment protection legislation is
associated with smaller equilibrium wage differentials. To the extent
that job security provisions explicitly require, or implicitly encourage,
payments from the firing firm to departing employees, more stringent
employment protection legislation implies that mobility costs are at
least partly borne by firms, rather than by workers, and this should be
associated with smaller wage differentials in the presence of voluntary
mobility across jobs. Figure 9 shows that indicators of the intensity of
labor reallocation across firms are only mildly related to employment
protection rigidity indicators. This negative evidence has been the sub-
ject of extensive investigation (see, for example, Bertola, 1999). The
data are very noisy, which may explain the insignificant relationship
between the two variables. The bivariate relationship displayed in fig-
ure 9, however, is not driven by obvious missing covariates. For ex-
ample, the cyclical state of the economy has very small effects within
each country, so the timing of turnover measurement cannot account
for the lack of a stronger relationship between employment protection
legislation and turnover. The evidence does not readily support a simple
view of employment protection legislation as a rigidity factor. This
may, perhaps, be taken to indicate that in terms of the simple frame-
work above, payments to laid-off workers foster the financing of mobil-
ity by financially constrained workers.
In practice, rigid labor market configurations appear quite effec-
tive in sheltering workers from idiosyncratic labor-income fluctua-
tions. The OECD index of the stringency of employment protection
legislation is strongly associated with average tenure lengths (see
figure 10). It is also positively associated with wage stability indica-
tors (figure 11). The latter piece of evidence only refers to the few
countries for which time-series stability indicators are available, but
it is particularly relevant to the theoretical perspective outlined above.
In heavily regulated labor markets, workers who are employed tend
to remain employed, and their wages tend to remain stable over time.
Stability of labor income for such workers is valuable in protecting
their consumption (and that of their families) from fluctuations.38 Giuseppe Bertola
In the absence of suitable smoothing instruments, heterogeneous
welfare losses from labor demand instability may rationalize frequently
expressed concerns with increasing wage inequality and labor market
insecurity in the United States, the United Kingdom, and other rela-
tively unregulated labor markets. The simple evidence of figure 11 can
also be interpreted in terms of the welfare effects of labor income in-
equality and instability at the individual level. As in Bénabou and Ok
(2001), inequality can be associated with higher welfare for risk-averse
individuals if mobility is intense and if the transition probabilities to
higher and lower income (and consumption) levels are nonlinear, so as
to give good prospects of upward mobility. This condition is almost
satisfied in the United States, where individuals need not resent in-
equality very much. In other OECD countries, however, workers’ pros-
pects of upward mobility appear much more limited—and even when
currently poor workers may look forward to higher future income,
financial markets tend to prevent consumption smoothing. Data and
information are scarce on households’ (as opposed to firms’) financial
market access. Bertola and Koeniger (2004) show that less-developed
consumer credit (as determined by countries’ historically determined
judicial efficiency) makes stable labor incomes more attractive from
the perspective of welfare theory, and it is empirically associated with
stringent employment protection legislation and wage compression
in available cross-country data. To the extent that wage inequality is
Figure 9. Employment Protection and Job Turnovera
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from OECD.
a. The horizontal axis is the fixed-term and regular employment protection legislation ranking; the vertical axis
is job turnover, measured as absolute employment increases and declines across all firms, normalized by
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endogenous to labor market institutions, it is not surprising that it is
very limited in countries with low earnings mobility and tight bor-
rowing constraints.
While labor reallocation across jobs is only mildly related to the
stringency of employment protection legislation in OECD countries
Figure 11. Employment Protection Legislation and Earnings
Fluctuationsa
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from OECD.
a. The horizontal axis is the overall employment protection indicator in the late 1980s; the vertical axis is wage
stability, measured as the correlation of earnings over five years after 1986 for full-time employees.
Figure 10. Employment Protection Legislation and Job Tenurea
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from OECD.
a. The horizontal axis is the overall employment protection rank in the late 1990s; the vertical axis is the mean
tenure across jobs existing in 1995.40 Giuseppe Bertola
(figure 9), flows between employment and unemployment are much
smaller in economies with a high degree of employment protection (see
Blanchard and Portugal, 2001). Economies that provide equal and stable
incomes to employed workers often feature other institutions (like collec-
tive bargaining) that tend to increase average wages, make low-produc-
tivity workers difficult to employ, and generate a large and stagnant
stock of unemployed workers. The data provide indications of meaning-
ful trade-offs between employment rates and wage equalization. Figure
12 shows that higher wage inequality is significantly associated with
higher employment rates, after controlling for country effects (which
may capture institutional and structural features that change only slowly
over time, if at all, within each country) and time effects (which may
offer a stylized summary measure of the common technological or trade-
related forces that tended to increase the differentiation and turbulence
of labor demand in industrialized countries over the 1970–2000 period).8
To the extent that overall employment is lowered by high collectively
bargained wages, unemployment and other forms of non-employment
are concentrated at the beginning and end of individual working careers,
as well as among women.9
8. Bertola, Blau, and Kahn (2002a) and Bertola (2004a) offer a more detailed
discussion of such phenomena, as well as the role of labor market institutions in
mediating the impact of structural shocks on wage and employment patterns.
9. Bertola, Blau, and Kahn (2002b) show that institutions motivated by rent
extraction in labor’s favor naturally tend to induce stronger wage increases and
steeper employment declines, for elastically supplied labor.
Figure 12. Residuals from Regression on Year and Country
Dummiesa
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from OECD.
a. The horizontal axis is the difference between the median wage and the tenth percentile of the overall wage
distribution; the vertical axis is the employment rate of the working-age population.Distribution, Efficiency, and Labor Market Regulation 41
4. LATIN AMERICAN DATA AND EVIDENCE
The literature is just beginning to apply the insights reviewed above
to OECD countries. The cross-country set of labor market institutions
and outcomes assembled by Djankov and others (2003) spans a very
wide range of countries, and the authors argue that historically deter-
mined judicial and legal systems may be viewed as an exogenous source
of institutional variability across countries. For Latin America, the
contributions summarized and discussed by Heckman and Pagés (2004)
offer mostly country-specific studies of time-series experiences, which
emphasize the role and impact of labor market reforms and the use of
microeconomic information. Reforms, however, are infrequent and sel-
dom radical, and they do not appear to produce consistent patterns of
effects.
 Research is hampered by the relative scarcity of comparable cross-
country information on the relevant static, dynamic, and distribu-
tional aspects. Unemployment and labor force participation (or
employment) rates are available in the World Bank WDI database
yearly only from 1980 to 2000 for most (but not all) countries. Some
yearly data are missing, perhaps indicating changes of country-spe-
cific definitions. Not all countries are large enough to represent an
independent observation, and not all countries in the WDI database
are also present in institutional-indicator databases. The relevant in-
formation is available for a set of twenty industrialized and sixteen
Latin American countries.
 The available information on Latin American institutions is also
less plentiful and precise than that compiled and made available for
OECD countries. The Heckman and Pagés (2004) study of Latin Ameri-
can labor laws is based on institutional information obtained from
surveys of country officials, aggregated in an index aimed at summa-
rizing in terms of wage labor costs the impact not only of social secu-
rity and other tax-and-subsidy provisions, but also of firing restrictions,
on the basis of U.S. turnover rates. This indicator is somewhat sparse
and cannot properly assess employment protection legislation’s im-
pact on employment dynamics. However, when consistently computed
for both OECD and Latin American countries, it does indicate that
the latter tend to be more regulated. A similar impression is con-
veyed by the purely institutional indicators compiled by the World
Bank’s Rapid Response Unit, which are displayed in figure 13 along42 Giuseppe Bertola
with a simple index of collective-bargaining rights that may capture
workers’ ability to implement low-employment outcomes.10
These simple data deliver equally simple messages. First, institu-
tional interference with employers’ freedom to dismiss workers covaries
positively with constraints on individual contractual freedom across
both OECD and Latin American countries—and not only among the
former. This is consistent with the notion that both may be motivated
by underlying country-specific economic and political concerns with
imperfect (especially from the workers’ point of view) laissez-faire out-
comes. Second, Latin American countries (with the exception of Uru-
guay and Jamaica) cluster in the high-regulation quadrant of the figure,
10. The index is from the 2003 Labor Database maintained by the Yale School
of Management’s International Institute for Corporate Governance (available at
iicg.som.yale.edu/data/datasets/labor_dataset_4_01_03.xls). Experimentation with
the index of unionization rights gives rather different results; in particular, it
yields no association with low-employment outcomes. This may indicate that the
quality of the data is poor or that unions foster efficiency in the face of both
market and government imperfections, along the lines of Checchi and Lucifora
(2002).
Figure 13. Covariation across Labor Market Institutionsa
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from World Bank, Rapid Response website (rru.worldbank.org/
DoingBusiness); and International Institute for Corporate Governance, 2003 labor database (iicg.som.yale.edu/
data/datasets/labor_dataset_4_01_03.xls).
a. The horizontal axis is the World Bank’s flexibility-of-firing index from 0 (most flexible”) to 100 (least flexible);
the vertical axis is the International Institute for Corporate Governance’s index of collective-bargaining legal
rights, measured as the “normalized sum of (i) labor union power [employer duty to bargain with unions, extension
of collective contracts to third parties, law allows closed shops, (ii) right to unionization in the constitution, and
(iii) right to collective bargaining in the constitution” (index_col_barg1 in the data set). The countries included
in the figure are as follows, with the abbreviated code given in parentheses: Argentina (Arg), Australia (Aus),
Austria (Aut), Belgium (Bel), Bolivia (Bol), Brazil (Bra), Canada (Can), Chile (Chl), Colombia (Col), Costa Rica
(CRi), Denmark (Dnk), Dominican Republic (Dom), Ecuador (Ecu), Finland (Fin), France (Fra), Germany (Ger),
Greece (Grc), Honduras (Hnd), Ireland (Irl), Italy (Ita), Jamaica (Jam), Japan (Jpn), Mexico (Mex), Netherlands
(Nld), New Zealand (NZ), Nicaragua (Nic), Norway (Nor), Panama (Pan), Peru (Per), Portugal (Prt), Spain (Spa),
Sweden (Swe), United Kingdom (UK), United States (US), and Uruguay (Ury), Venezuela (Ven). Other countries
omitted for lack of data or economic significance in unweighted regressions.Distribution, Efficiency, and Labor Market Regulation 43
in the company of such OECD countries as Germany and Spain, while
Anglo-Saxon countries are found in the opposite quadrant. Finally, the
covariation between these conceptually different indicators is not per-
fect, and this can be exploited, in principle, to disentangle their differ-
ent theoretical effects.
Empirical work on such data may provide indications of the data’s
quality and the fit of theoretical implications. Over and above the qual-
ity of the data, however, empirical investigation is constrained by their
scarcity. Unlike the simple bivariate diagrams of the previous section,
which illustrate empirical relations whose robustness could be assessed
in light of multivariate results in other work, those that follow illus-
trate methodological issues rather than offer empirically sound results.
To see whether labor market outcomes across these countries
are consistent with available institutional information, consider first
the theoretical association between dismissal costs and employment
stability. Figure 14 reports the cross-country association between the
available index of dismissal regulation and a simple measure of em-
ployment stability (namely, the deviation of country-specific coeffi-
cients from their cross-country average in a regression of changes of
employment rates on the growth rate of output per worker). This
coefficient should be more positive when employment reacts strongly
to changes in productivity and demand, that is, when labor hoarding
is less pervasive. The regression also includes country-specific inter-
cepts. These may, to some extent, control for the underlying produc-
tivity and employment rate trends. The results, however, can certainly
be polluted by regime changes in such trends, as may occur on tran-
sition out of agriculture and on changes in demographic employment
patterns across genders and age groups. Employment does react more
strongly to production changes in countries with more rigid employ-
ment relationships, but the relation is far from clear-cut. A linear
regression of employment-rate changes on GDP growth rates and on
the interaction of GDP growth with the index of employment protec-
tion yields the expected negative sign for the latter’s coefficient, but
the t statistic is only 0.67. Different cyclicality of wages in different
countries could be an important source of bias and noise in the esti-
mated relationship. The evidence from OECD countries indicates that
the cyclical behavior of wages is very shallow in all countries. The
evidence for Latin American countries may be different, but compa-
rable wage data are not as readily available.
The assumption that economic structures and shock intensities
are similar when assessing the implications of institutions is clearly44 Giuseppe Bertola
less appropriate in for Latin America than for the OECD, where all
countries experienced broadly similar fiscal and monetary policies and
energy cost shocks. An extensive study of OECD countries could collect
observable shock indicators of the type considered by Blanchard and
Wolfers (2000). In the absence of such information, however, one can
infer the typical strength of labor demand and other shocks in the rel-
evant countries from the volatility of production. That volatility is, it-
self, affected by movements in both labor demand labor supply, or more
generally by the cyclical character of wage fluctuations (which, as men-
tioned, are not easily measured for OECD countries). Volatility is also
affected by the stringency of constraints on employer’s ability to hire
and fire labor: if employment patterns are smoothed by firing restric-
tions, then total production should be less variable, and production per
worker more variable, than would otherwise be the case in the face of
similar driving processes. For a given value of the firing rules index in
figure 15, and with presumably similar incentives to engage in labor
hoarding behavior, Latin American countries tend to display higher
volatility of production. Those countries’ labor demand thus appears to
be less stable than that of OECD countries—and their employment
dynamics, while more pronounced than those of more industrialized
and less regulated labor markets, are substantially smoothed by bind-
ing institutional restrictions.
Figure 14. Employment Protection and Employment Stabilitya
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from World Bank, Rapid Response website (rru.worldbank.org/
DoingBusiness) and World Development Indicators.
a. The horizontal axis is the World Bank’s flexibility-of-firing index from 0 (most flexible) to 100 (least flexible);
the vertical axis is the deviation from the overall average of the country-specific slope coefficient in a regression
of employment rate changes on real output growth rates, with country-specific intercepts (1980–2000, although
the sample period stops earlier for some countries). See the notes to figure 13 for a definition of the country
codes.
b. The horizontal line depicts the average effect of worker output growth rate on employment changes.Distribution, Efficiency, and Labor Market Regulation 45
Turning next to the impact of regulation on employment and un-
employment rates, it is instructive to first consider the bivariate asso-
ciation of dismissal restrictions and average employment rates in the
1980–2000 period (the shorter period of data availability). Figure 16 dis-
plays a mild negative association: employment rates are higher in coun-
tries (such as the Anglo-Saxon members of the OECD) that do not
regulate dismissals extensively than in countries (such as Latin Ameri-
can ones) where employment protection legislation is stringent.
Figure 15. Firing Rules and Volatility of Production per Workera
a. The horizontal axis is the World Bank’s flexibility-of-firing index from 0 (most flexible”) to 100 (least flexible);
(see previous figures); the vertical axis is the standard deviation of the GDP growth rate per employed worker
(computed for 1980–2000 based on data from World Bank, World Development Indicators). See the notes to figure
13 for a definition of the country codes.
Figure 16. Firing Rules and Average Employment Ratesa
a. The horizontal axis is the World Bank’s flexibility-of-firing index from 0 (most flexible”) to 100 (least flexible);
(see previous figures); the vertical axis is the employment rate (computed for 1980–2000 based on data from
World Bank, World Development Indicators). See the notes to figure 13 for a definition of the country codes.46 Giuseppe Bertola
This association does not necessarily imply that rigid labor market
relations damage employment. It is possible, in principle, to control for
the structure and evolution of the labor force, for other observable devel-
opment indicators, and for unobservable country-specific and time-
varying institutional indicators (see Bertola, Blau, and Kahn, 2002b). In
practice, however, suitable data are not available for Latin American
and other non-OECD countries. Nevertheless, available indicators of fir-
ing costs and collective bargaining are imperfectly correlated, as shown
in figure 13. This offers a useful opportunity to disentangle the effects of
institutions such as employment protection, which are meant to protect
workers against uninsurable shocks, from those of institutions such as
collective bargaining rights, which are aimed at decreasing employment
and increasing wages.11
To this end, table 1 reports the results of regressing unemployment
and employment rates on the two institutional indicators displayed in
figure 13, both for the whole sample and allowing Latin American coef-
ficients to differ from OECD ones. The indicators are constant within
each country, and the fit of these equations is poor.12 In the pooled
regressions reported in the first and fourth columns of the table, how-
ever, collective bargaining rights tend to increase unemployment and
decrease employment rates, which is consistent with theoretical pre-
dictions. Theory has no clear prediction regarding the impact of firing
restrictions on overall employment or unemployment. In regressions
that control for wage-setting institutions, firing restrictions tend to be
insignificantly (and negatively) associated with unemployment and in-
significantly (and positively) associated with employment, which is con-
trary to the impression conveyed by the bivariate plot of figure 16. This
simple evidence offers some support to the theoretical distinction be-
tween labor market policies affecting wage setting versus mobility. It
casts doubt on the view that all labor market regulation has adverse
employment and welfare effects, and it may suggest useful method-
ological venues for further data gathering and econometric work.
The evidence is rough, however, and far from clear-cut. The second
and fifth columns report regressions with a simple Latin American
dummy, which turns out to be more economically and statistically sig-
nificant than the institutional indicators. When the latter are interacted
11. Of course, unemployment insurance and payroll taxation with nonem-
ployment subsidies also have related effects, but better information is required to
disentangle them.
12. Specifications with year dummies, which may capture employment devel-
opments that are common across countries within the period, yield similar esti-
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with the Latin American dummy, the Latin American coefficients are
significantly different as a group from the OECD coefficients in the case
of unemployment, but the differences of individual coefficients are large,
insignificant, and unbelievable. If these regressions are taken at face
value, collective bargaining rights would tend to increase unemploy-
ment less in Latin America than in the OECD; firing restrictions would
have no impact on OECD unemployment but a somewhat negative im-
pact on Latin American unemployment; and the different unemploy-
ment outcomes would be accounted for by other features specific to Latin
America. This evidence fails to support simplistic views of labor market
institutions, but it clearly does not offer precise insights. Given the lack
of appropriate controls and the poor quality of institutional information,
it is impossible to tell whether similar institutions have structurally
different implications in different countries.
Unemployment rate Employment rate











Test of coefficient equality
across Latin America
and OECD (p value)
Table 1. Regressions of Unemployment and Employment Rates
on Institutional Indicatorsa
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from World Bank, World Development Indicators and Rapid Response
website (rru.worldbank.org/DoingBusiness); and International Institute for Corporate Governance, 2003 labor
database (iicg.som.yale.edu/data/datasets/labor_dataset_4_01_03.xls).
a. The dependent variable is the unemployment rate (in percent) in regressions 1 through 3 and the employment
rate (as a fraction of the total labor force) in regressions 4 through 6. Unreported results for specifications with
year dummies are very similar. The sample covers 593 country*year observations, clustered by country. Robust
t statistics in parentheses.
b. Flexibility of firing is indexed from 0 (most flexible) to 100 (least flexible).
c. Collective bargaining rights are indexed from 0 (weakest) to 1 (strongest).
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5. THE STATE AND FUTURE OF LATIN AMERICAN LABOR
MARKET RESEARCH
The quality of the data—and thus of the empirical results—on
labor market institutions and outcomes currently available for Latin
America is perhaps comparable to that available for OECD coun-
tries fifteen years ago (see, for example, Bertola, 1990). The aggre-
gate data broadly conform to basic theoretical implications based on
the very simple indicators and regressions examined in section 4
above. Collective bargaining may well tend to decrease employment
and increase unemployment, because lower employment and higher
wages are attractive for workers aiming to improve their own (and
not a representative individual’s) welfare. The effects of more gen-
eral forms of labor market regulation are less clear-cut, and the
evidence does not refute the theoretical prediction that employment
protection legislation stabilizes employment without decreasing its
average level below that implied by the wage-setting process.
Little information is available for assessing more subtle chan-
nels of interaction, but the available evidence appears to be consis-
tent with the insights gained by the literature’s analysis of OECD
data. For example, Kugler’s (2004) difference-in-differences analysis
of a Colombian employment protection reform finds that its effect on
unemployment was small (a reduction of 0.15 percent) and of doubt-
ful significance. And the cross-national evidence analyzed by Heckman
and Pagés (2004) finds little evidence of a meaningful association
between their employment protection indicator and unemployment
outcomes.13 Both of these studies report important effects of labor
market regulation on the stability of employment relations and on
the composition of employment across demographic groups. These
disaggregate findings are consistent with the OECD evidence dis-
cussed in section 3 above, and they are readily interpreted in terms
of the distributional implications emphasized above and the desir-
ability of labor income stability and disemployment (especially of sec-
ondary labor force groups, as in Bertola, Blau, and Kahn, 2002b).
The comparable labor-income inequality and stability data that
would make it possible to extend the discussion of section 3 to
13. Earlier versions of both Kugler’s and Heckman and Pagés’s research
reported larger unemployment effects, which were reduced (respectively) by more
careful computation of steady-state relations and by the inclusion of Chile in the
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Latin American countries are not yet available. When extrapolating
theoretical and empirical work from OECD countries to the Latin
American reality, it is important to account for differences between
these two groups of countries in terms of within-country inequality
of resources and levels of market development, on the one hand, and
the time-series instability of macroeconomic and institutional con-
ditions, on the other.
Inequality is a serious matter in Latin American and other
industrializing countries. The Gini coefficients reported in the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators database range from
24.7 (Denmark, 1992) to 40.8 (United States, 1997) among OECD
countries, and from 36.4 (Jamaica, 1996) to 60.7 (Brazil, 1998) among
Latin American ones. The simple average of the twenty OECD
Gini coefficients is 30.9; that of the twenty-three Latin American
Ginis is 49.4. If, as argued above, labor market institutions often
trade production efficiency and profits for the protection of work-
ers with limited access to financial markets, then conflicts of in-
terests between capitalists and workers may well be more relevant
in Latin America than conflicts between employed and unemployed
workers (and other categories), as studied by Saint-Paul (2000) in
an industrialized context. Furthermore, mobility in Latin America
is probably more limited by a strong class structure and limited
education and training opportunities than in most of the devel-
oped countries depicted in figure 11. Thus, if labor market institu-
tions are endogenous to political processes in which workers have
some weight, then institutional interference should be more in-
trusive in Latin America than in OECD countries. Furthermore,
to the extent that income stabilization for workers with limited or
no access to international financial markets destabilizes other
agents’ (capital) income, capital flows in that region should be
highly volatile (Bertola and Drazen, 1994).
 As regards the dynamics of macroeconomic and institutional
developments, the relevance of forward-looking considerations in
labor market behavior and the strong reform tensions in Latin
American labor markets imply that measurement issues should,
in principle, be addressed by using some measure of expected (rather
than current) institutional rules in constructing forward-looking
indicators. An example is the simple, but potentially insightful
measurement approach of Heckman and Pagés (2004), in contrast
with the purely cross-sectional indicators used above for illustrative
purposes. The relevant empirical issues are complex because50 Giuseppe Bertola
suitable reform instruments are difficult to identify in a setting where
not only outcomes, but also institutions may be viewed as endogenous
variables. Still, detailed country-specific studies of the type collected
and discussed by Heckman and Pagés (2004) offer intriguing
indications of sensible covariation between reform features and
economic circumstances, and they suggest that the starkness of Latin
American developments should offer fertile grounds for interpretation
of similar, if slower, developments in European countries. For
example, Cassoni, Allen, and Labadie (2004) report that Uruguay
experienced a dramatic regime change from a so-called command
economy to unionization and from near-autarky to Mercosur
integration. The large increase in the economy’s openness, which
presumably resulted in more elastic labor demand, had theoretical
and empirical implications for labor market interactions that appear
similar to and much more dramatic than those relevant to
industrialized countries experiencing globalization and European
integration: the 49 percent real wage decrease in the decade after
1973 in Uruguay certainly dwarfs wage-moderation trends in Europe
in the 1990s.
Inequality and reforms interact importantly. If labor market in-
stitutions are a partial substitute for inefficient financial contract
enforcement (Bertola and Koeniger, 2004), and if increased flexibil-
ity in the labor market makes limited access to consumption smooth-
ing all the more painful for workers, then labor market liberalization
will face heavy resistance in industrialized countries with poor fi-
nancial markets. Labor and financial market reforms should there-
fore be packaged together, as was the case in the United Kingdom
in the 1980s (Koeniger, forthcoming). As both the redistributive po-
litical appeal and the efficiency costs of labor market regulation are
enhanced by Latin America’s inequality and instability, much more
dramatic reforms may occur there than in OECD countries. From
this perspective, Latin American countries offer a rich set of reform
experiences: several have pioneered the use of notional benefit ac-
counts, which may indeed target the financial market failures em-
phasized above as possible rationales for observed collective interference
with labor market outcomes. If the rate of return on notional benefit
accounts suitably reflects that of investment opportunities available
at the level of the aggregate economy but unavailable to individual
workers, they can ease the liquidity-constraint problems studied by
Bertola and Koeniger (2004), at least if withdrawals are allowed in
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and institutional dynamics in most Latin American countries offers
empirical opportunities to gain further insights into theoretical
mechanisms. The equally dramatic heterogeneity of personal cir-
cumstances in less developed countries makes it important to take
into account the intended benefits of institutional interference with
the workings of labor markets when discussing their actual short-
comings.52 Giuseppe Bertola
APPENDIX
Let the relationship between the marginal worker’s revenue prod-
uct and the wage be
that is, labor demand has constant elasticity 0 < β  < 1 and is subject
to multiplicative exogenous shocks. The level of that shock, A, and
the employment, L, and wage, W, are all indexed by i. They may
refer to a specific firm, sector, or region within an aggregate economy.
To make the points of interest, it is sufficient to consider only two
possible values of that index: i = g, for good employment opportuni-
ties and i = b for bad ones. The wage-equivalent income of workers
who are not employed in either kind of job also plays a role in what
follows; let it be denoted Wu and, for simplicity, let it be the same for
all individuals in a population of total size     .
The number of nonemployed labor units are denoted U, while P
represents the proportion of employment at high-productivity sites.
This yields
Equality of marginal productivity at the two sites is obtained if
which, since Ag > Ab, implies that the fraction of employment in jobs
with higher-than-average productivity is intuitively larger than the
fraction in jobs with lower-than-average productivity. The overall level
of employment must equate wages to the outside opportunity, Wu.
The condition,
is solved by
If this is positive, then overall employment falls short of total
available labor,     . Otherwise, all individuals are employed, and their
income equals or exceeds Wu.
L
() and g LL U P =− () () 1. b LL U P =− −
(A3) () () () , 1 bg u AP L U P L UW
−β −β
   −− = Α − =   
()
1/ 1/ 1/ . gb u U LA AW
ββ − β =− +
L
(A1) , ii i AL W
−β =
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Let the utility accruing to workers be a power 0 < α  < 1 of their
labor income, and consider a simple-minded measure of labor’s col-
lective welfare—namely, the sum total of all workers’ utility:
When Wg = Wb = Wu as in equation (3), workers’ welfare is simply
given by (Wu)α       : all workers are indifferent between working or sim-
ply enjoying their nonemployment opportunities. Lower employment
increases aggregate worker welfare by increasing wages along sloped
demand curves in the form of equation (1). If the proportions of em-
ployment allocated to the two types of jobs are kept fixed at the ex-
pressions in equation (2), then
and thus
is increasing in U at the point where Wg = Wb = Wu: as long as βα  < 1,
workers’ welfare is maximized when the ratio of wages to nonem-
ployment income equals (1 – αβ )–1/α . In the α  = 1 case of risk neutral-
ity, this is a familiar markup in the form (1 – β )–1. The markup can be
shown to be smaller when α  < 1 and utility is not only increasing, but
also strictly concave in labor income. Intuitively, higher unemploy-
ment increases both the mean and the variance of workers’ incomes,
and this is less attractive when the utility function is more concave.
Let p denote the probability of a shock that causes productivity to
fall from Ag to Ab, and also of the opposite transition. While workers
who are not relocating earn Wb or Wg, workers who move from a bad
to a good job earn XWg, with X ≤  1. Again supposing that workers’
utility flows are a concave function of their labor income, consider
the undiscounted expected values of utility accruing over an infinite
horizon to workers holding each type of job. If Vg denotes that value
from the point of view of a worker who holds a good job and has no
reason to move, then
()() ()() () . gb u V P LUW PLUW W U
α αα
=− + 1 − ( − ) +
L
(A4)
() () , gb g b W WAA L U
−β β 1β 1β == + −
() () () gb u VL U A A W U
βα α 1 − β α 1β 1β =− + +
() () , gg gb V Wp V p V
α
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since the job may remain good with probability 1 – p but may also
turn bad. Symmetrically, a worker holding a bad job and remaining
there can hope that a positive labor demand shock will be realized,
which occurs with probability p. Thus,
Subtracting equation (6) from equation (5) yields
A worker holding a bad job, however, can move to a good job. The
value of doing so is
If workers are individually indifferent to mobility, it must be the
case that this is the same Vb in equation (6), which implies that
This equation and equation (7) yield a relationship between the
wages paid by the two types of jobs, which differ in terms of both
their current productivity and possible future developments:
Solving for the wage configuration that makes mobility optimal
for workers, labor allocation must be such as to yield
In equilibrium, the proportional wage premium paid by good jobs
is positive, since 0 < 1 – (1 – Xα )2p < 1 for {2p, X, α } ∈  (0, 1), and de-
creasing in X, since mobility becomes costless (and equalizes wages)
as X approaches unity. This premium is also increasing in p, the prob-
ability of a change in labor demand conditions: as labor demand be-
comes less stable, larger wage premiums are needed to compensate
mobility investments by workers who have an option to stay put and
hope for an improvement of their current job’s conditions. As p ap-
proaches one-half, the proportional wage premium approaches 1/X.
(A7) () ( ) () 2. gb g b pV V W W
α α
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() () . gg b XW p V pV
α
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In the p = 0.5 case, in which the future outlook is the same at all jobs,
wages must be such as to compensate workers for their mobility costs
within the same period when mobility occurs.
Conversely, if p < 0.5, in which case the labor income of workers
who change jobs is lower than Wb, mobility is still optimal, but only
because workers can look forward to persistently high wages once they
reach a good job. The relevance of forward-looking considerations
implies that their utility’s degree of concavity plays an important role
in determining equilibrium wage differentials and the intensity of
mobility. In fact, the equilibrium ratio of good to bad wages is de-
creasing in α  as long as p < 0.5: it is lowest at the upper boundary of
the α  ∈  (0, 1] range, and it increases as α  declines toward zero, mak-
ing the utility function increasingly inelastic.
With P again representing the proportion of employment at good
firms, in equilibrium it must be the case that
so
As a fraction, p, of high-productivity jobs experiences a negative
shock, and the same fraction of bad jobs experiences a positive one,
p(2P – 1) units of labor are relocated each period. Each moving worker
earns only a fraction, X, of the good wage to which he or she is moving.
Consequently, in the aggregate, mobility dissipates (1 – X)Wg =
(1 – X)Ag P–β  units of output in flow terms. Total production net of such
costs is
The labor allocation delivered by this simple labor market’s de-
centralized equilibrium does not maximize this expression. That is, it
does not satisfy the first-order condition,
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The first three terms of condition (A11) add up to zero in equilib-
rium only if mobility decisions are taken on a risk-neutral basis (α  = 1);
otherwise, they exceed zero, since mobility by uninsured workers
calls for larger wage differentials. Even under risk neutrality, the
last positive term would call for even higher P and even lower wage
differentials, because the proportional specification implies that ex-
ternal effects reduce the cost of mobility as mobility becomes more
intense and reduces good wages.
The average utility generated for workers by each unit of em-
ployment is
To simplify the notation, let the tax-and-subsidy rate be the same
fraction, τ  of pre-tax wages (and labor marginal productivities). The
after-tax mobility condition for uninsured workers is then
where the proportional mobility subsidy, ν , must obey the policy’s
budget constraint: ν X(1 – τ )Wg is paid to each of the p(2P – 1) units of
labor reallocated in a typical period, and the revenue of payroll taxes
net of low-wage subsidies is [τ Ag(P)1–β  – τ Ab(1 – P)1–β ], but only a frac-
tion, λ,  of this is available to finance mobility. The shortfall of λ  below
unity represents administration costs and the deadweight costs of
distorted economic behavior. Hence,
is the mobility subsidy rate. If equation (13) is rewritten inserting
this expression and expressions for gross wages in terms of P, the
(A13) () ()
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equilibrium fraction of high-productivity jobs, then the latter is de-
termined in equilibrium by the condition,
which can be solved numerically.
() ( ) ( ) ( )
() ( ) ( ) ( )
()
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